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With the introduction of District Development 
Authorities  (see O’Neill 2006) and amendments to 
the Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Gov-
ernments, Papua New Guinea’s O’Neill Government 
has set in train an ambitious and game-changing insti-
tutional reform agenda that is set to re-constitute the 
political settlement by vesting additional powers in 
Open members of parliament (MPs). Compounding 
this, there are concurrent and not particularly well-
aligned reform agendas being pursued by different 
constitutional authorities. These include amendments 
to the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties 
and Candidates, currently before parliament, the Con-
stitutional and Law Reform Commission’s pending 
review of the Organic Law on National and Local- 
level Government Elections (OLNLLGE) as well as 
the expected Boundaries Commission review in 2015. 
Given the strong likelihood of reforms that will 
affect the conduct of and preparations for the 2017 
elections, a consideration of the 2002 reforms to 
OLNLLGE, which saw the introduction of Limited 
Preferential Voting (LPV), is timely. In this, the first 
in a series of In Briefs assessing the shift to LPV, the 
impact upon mandates and electoral outcomes is 
considered.1 
The Shift to LPV
In his Report to Parliament on the 1997 National 
Election, electoral commissioner Reuben Kaiulo 
advocated for the re-introduction of preferential vot-
ing ‘premised on the need to reduce the number of 
candidates to ensure that the MP has a wider basis 
of support and endorsement, and also to promote 
collaboration among candidates and counter the 
surge in violence’ (Kaiulo 2002:170). In doing so, he 
also predicted that administering elections under 
LPV would ‘be more costly, become slower and less 
tidy’ (ibid:179). The latter has proved true on all 
counts (see Haley & Zubrinich 2013). 
Elections in PNG attract large numbers of can-
didates and are fiercely contested. Voter turnout is 
always high, and, with each election, candidate num-
bers have tended to increase. Consequently, MPs 
are elected with small mandates. In 2002 and 2007, 
individual seats were contested, on average, by 25/26 
candidates. The 2012 elections saw a 25% increase 
in nominations and a record 3,435 candidates, with 
Simbu Regional fielding 71 candidates. The turnover 
rate for MPs in PNG is also high, with only 40% of 
incumbents returned at the two most recent elections.
The Impact of LPV on Mandates
In the three general elections prior to the introduc-
tion of LPV (1992, 1997 and 2002), the majority of 
candidates were elected with less than 20% of the 
vote, and many with overall vote shares of less than 
10%. In 2002, 58% of MPs (63/109) were elected 
with less than 20% of the vote and 20% (22/109) 
with less than 10% of the vote in their respective 
electorates. The mean percentage of votes required 
to win a seat was 20.1%, and only 4 MPs achieved a 
vote share of greater than 40%.
It was expected that LPV would ‘require candi-
dates to widen their support base’ (Standish 2006: 
197) and ‘promote the election of more broadly 
supported candidates’ (Reilly 2006:189). Certainly it 
has done the latter, although it remains the case that 
the vast majority of MPs still only manage to garner 
support from a minority of their constituents. It is 
also the case that MPs’ primary support bases have 
changed little. For example, 56% of MPs elected in 
2007 (59/105) and 2012 (60/107)2 received a primary 
vote share of 20% or less, compared with 58% in 2002.
Analysis and scrutiny of the 2007 and 2012 elec-
tion results reveals that after allocation of prefer-
ences the ‘mandates’ of winning candidates broadly 
increased by 50%,3 such that successful candidates 
typically have the support of approximately one-third 
of voters in their respective electorates. The national 
average mandate in both 2007 and 2012 was 33%, 
with winning candidates garnering on average 21.9% 
of the primary vote in 2007 and 21.4% in 2012. 
While MPs elected under LPV have wider popular 
mandates than those elected in 2002, few, even with 
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the benefit of preferences, managed to secure 50% of 
the vote. In fact, only eight MPs elected in 2007 and 
four elected in 2012 secured more than 50% of the 
allowable ballot, and only four in each case secured 
an absolute majority with the primary count. 
Under LPV, the number of candidates secur-
ing a mandate of greater than 40% has, however, 
increased significantly. While only 4% of MPs 
gained a mandate of greater than 40% in 2002, 11% 
did so in 2007 and 23% in 2012. This is heartening, 
as PNG MPs have long been criticised for deliv-
ering services only to those who vote for them. 
Nonetheless, the jury is very much out on whether 
increased mandates have produced better and more 
equitable service delivery. 
The Impact of LPV on Electoral Results
Another way to measure the impact of LPV is to 
consider the number of cases in which the distribu-
tion of preferences saw a candidate other than the 
one who led after the primary count go on to win 
the seat. In the 2007 and 2012 elections, close to 
one quarter (23%) of all candidates who led on first 
preferences subsequently lost. Both 2007 and 2012 
also saw a number of sitting MPs unseated despite 
gaining the largest share of first preferences. Pref-
erences proved most influential in respect of the 
provincial seats, where 30% of candidates who led 
after the primary count failed to hold on to their 
lead through the distribution of preferences. 
Conclusion
As Ruben Kaiulo predicted, administering LPV 
elections is more costly and more complicated. 
With LPV there has been a five-fold increase in the 
current price of elections from K75 million in 2002 
to 365 million in 2012 (Henderson and Boneo 
2013:11). In addition, the return of writs was 
extended twice in both 2007 and 2012. Even with 
the widened support base LPV guarantees, more 
than 90% of PNG MPs are still elected by a minor-
ity of their constituents. Moreover, three-quarters 
of results would remain the same if a simple first-
past-the-post count was applied, begging the ques-
tion: Has LPV delivered the returns its proponents 
hoped for and can PNG afford to retain LPV?
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Endnotes
1 LPV is a voting system in which electors rank their 
top three candidates in order of preference. Ballots 
are initially distributed based on each elector’s first 
preference. If a candidate secures more than half the  
votes cast, they win. If not, the weakest polling candi-
dates are eliminated in turn and their votes transferred 
through a series of instant runoffs until one candidate 
secures more than half of the allowable ballot.
2 Full results for the 2007 and 2012 elections are not 
publically available, with results for four electorates 
missing in each case. The analysis provided herein is 
based on the available results.
3 MP mandates under LPV are calculated by expressing 
the total votes received after preferences are distributed 
as a percentage of the total allowable ballot.
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